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This paper looks at presuppositions of adpositions, a topic which has not been examined much, in spite of the very 
large body of work on presuppositions. Some earlier assertions about adpositional presuppositions turn out not to be 
relevant, because (1) they are incorrect (2) presuppose and/or presupposition are not used in a technical sense in them, 
or (3) the presuppositions involved are not unique to adpositions. Some adpositions, e.g. despite, have been claimed 
to be factive, and thus could be presupposition triggers, but it is difficult to determine this, due to the fact that their 
complements are arguably always themselves presupposition triggers. On the other hand, directional adpositions are 
clearly presuppositional, as they trigger presuppositions about the location of an object/or entity before or after the 
motion whose description they are partly responsible for. Such facts may lead one to speculate about word classes 
and presuppositionality in general, and I will briefly discuss this issue.
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Background
Adpositions are not among the best-known or most dis-
cussed presupposition triggers, and there does not seem 
to be much research specifically on adpositions and pre-
supposition.1 In this paper I will investigate to what 
extent, if at all, adpositions are involved in creating pre-
supositions. It will turn out that many claims about the 
presuppositionality of adpositions are not correct, if we 
are thinking of presuppositions in the usual technical 
sense(s), and that there are few presuppositional adposi-
tions. Thus to some extent this paper will be a review 
(and criticism) of the relevant literature. However, there 
are some adpositions which can (or must) trigger presup-
positions, including several which have until now escaped 
attention, to my knowledge, and they will be discussed. 
We thus find that like verbs, the class of adpositions 
includes some words that are presupposition triggers (a 
minority) and many words that are not.
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. In 
“Adpositional ‘presuppositions’ which may not be such 
or which are not theoretically interesting” I look at and 
criticize some claims which have been made about pre-
suppositions of adpositions; in my view these claims are 
1 I will not discuss the presuppositions of temporal adpositions (e.g. before), 
which have received some attention, going back to Frege (1892:42, foot-
note**). For work on temporal adpositions (or on adpositions which can be 
used in a temporal sense), see e.g. Gründer (2008), König (1974), and Onea 
(2011). As noted in Macagno and Capone (2015), the preposition of can 
mean ‘before’ or ‘after’; in such situations it would presumably trigger the 
same presuppositions as before or after.
either incorrect or not specific to adpositions and hence 
not of interest if we are focussing on adpositions. In “Fac-
tive prepositions” I discuss possible presuppositions of 
factive prepositions; if there are factive prepositions, 
one would expect them to be preupposition triggers, 
like factive verbs. Several adpositions have indeed been 
asserted to be factive, but it may not be possible to verify 
these claims, as (according to some views), their comple-
ments themselves are always presupposition triggers. In 
“Directional adpositions” I examine the possibility that 
directional adpositions can trigger presuppositions, spe-
cifically about the location of objects or entities before 
the motion described by the clause in which they occur. 
As far as I know, the possible presuppositions of such 
adpositions have not previously been studied. The final 
section serves as the conclusion to the paper; in it I will 
make some more general remarks about presuppositions 
and word classes.
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Adpositional “presuppositions” which may not be 
such or which are not theoretically interesting
One must be careful when looking at previous work 
which apparently discusses presuppositions of adposi-
tions; this is because aside from their technical sense, 
presuppose and presupposition have everyday senses 
which are somewhat different,2 and even linguists may 
sometimes use these words in the latter senses, or they 
may think that they are using these terms in the standard 
linguistic senses when they are not. Consider, for exam-
ple, Feigenbaum’s (2002) paper on prepositions of French 
and Hebrew, in which these words occur several times, 
first in relation to the following examples (p. 171), which 
are given to illustrate the “deletive” meaning of French 
sans ‘without’:
(1a)  une maison sans jardin
  ‘a house without a garden’
(1b)  une maison avec un jardin
  ‘a house with a garden’
Feigenbaum (ibid.) says:
Deletion can be defined as the relationship between 
a positive and a negative referent, where the negative 
referent presupposes a contradictory relationship 
with its affirmative counterpart. Thus, statement 
(1a) presupposes that houses have gardens and can 
therefore be considered to be antonymic with (1b).
First of all (1a) is not a “statement”, as it is simply a 
noun phrase. Further, it is not the kind of noun phrase 
which is frequently mentioned in lists of presupposition 
triggers (e.g. Levinson 1983:181–184), as it is indefinite; 
compare the garden behind John’s house (as in The garden 
behind John’s house is/isn’t large), which presupposes the 
existence of the garden in question. I think that (1a) 
involves a conversational implicature rather than a pre-
supposition3: if houses did not commonly have gardens, 
it would be unnecessarily prolix to speak of a house with-
out a garden, as it would be to order a hamburger with-
out celery, since hamburgers are not generally served 
with celery. (I myself when ordering hamburgers often 
ask for them to be served without catsup, which is a sen-
sible thing to do, since, at least in some eating establish-
ments, the default situation is for them to have catsup.)
2 See Levinson (1983:168) for discussion and examples.
3 The distinction between presuppositions and conversational implicatures 
is not always as clear as one might expect (and hope). For that matter, the 
existence of a separate class of conclusions which we call presuppositions 
has not been universally accepted, as shown e.g. by the title of Sect.  8 of 
Atlas (2004), “The Reduction of Presuppositions to Conversational Impli-
cata: Accommodation, Calculability, and Common Ground”.
Consider also the following passage from Svenonius 
(2007:76):
S-selection is semantic selection, and is usually 
understood to hold of all the arguments of a head, 
not just its complements …. In this context I am 
interested in the s-selection by P for its complement; 
s-selection frequently surfaces in the form of presup-
positions. For example, in presupposes that its com-
plement be a container, and is infelicitous when the 
complement is not container-like. Being a presup-
position, the requirement is preserved under nega-
tion (#The cat sat in the mat is odd in the same way 
as #The cat didn’t sit in the mat). Similarly, among 
takes a complement which is complex, between takes 
a complement which consists of two parts, inside 
takes a complement which has ‘sides,’ and so on
The reference to “constancy under negation” (Levinson 
1983:168) shows that Svenonius is using presuppose and 
presupposition in a technical sense,4 or believes that he is, 
and, more specifically, in a semantic sense (as opposed to 
a pragmatic sense).5
 However, the “presuppositions” involved are rather 
different from the examples usually brought up in dis-
cussions of semantic presupposition, e.g. the “King of 
France” and “stopped smoking” types of examples. Could 
they, however, fit under a pragmatic view of presupposi-
tion, such as that expressed by Stalnaker (1973:447)?
A person’s presuppositions are the propositions 
whose truth he takes for granted, often uncon-
sciously, in a conversation, an inquiry, or a delibera-
tion. They are the background assumptions that may 
be used without being spoken - sometimes without 
being noticed
It seems that they could, but aside from being different 
from “conventional or semantic” (Beaver and Geurts 
2014) presuppositions, they are also rather different from 
“conversational” (ibid.) presuppositions e.g. “the presup-
position that the interlocutor speaks English” 
4 As van der Sandt (1988:37) says, “The oldest and best-known test for 
determining which syntactic constructions and lexical elements give rise to 
presuppositions is embedding under negation”. However, he then (ibid.:37–
39) mentions problems with this test.
5 Clark (1973) makes assertions about “presuppositions” of various English 
prepositions which seem at least vaguely similar to those of Svenonius. For 
example, on p. 40 he says: 
Consider the frame A is at/on/in B. All three prepositions assert that 
A is in the same location as B, but at, on, and in presuppose that the 
location of B is a one-, two-, and three-dimensional space, respec-
tively.
However, it is not clear whether he (thinks that he) is using presupposition 
in a technical sense.
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(ibid).6 One could say that Svenonius’ putative presuppo-
sitions of in, etc. are metalinguistic presuppositions (or 
assumptions), at least as he expresses them, because they 
have to do with properties of linguistic items (namely 
what their complements can be),7 though of course these 
properties are connected with properties of the real 
world. If our notion of presupposition covers these met-
alinguistic assumptions, then the door is open for vari-
ous other phenomena to be seen as presuppositions, e.g. 
c-selection and conventional implicatures.
Magidor (2013:141) has the same general idea as 
Svenonius;8 in order to explain “category mistakes” such 
as that in (2):
(2)  Jill ducked under the theory of relativity. 
(ibid.:140)
she says, “the infelicity of all these category mistakes can 
be explained as instance of presupposition failure”; the 
presupposition in this example is triggered by under. 
Later (p. 145) she states:
the infelicity of [(2)] can be explained by assuming 
that ‘x φ-ed under y’ triggers (roughly) the presuppo-
sition that y is located in space (or, assuming prepo-
sitions are generally of type <e, <<e,t>, <e,t≫>, the 
6 Obviously much depends on how one defines presupposition. An anony-
mous referee has recommended that I define adposition. In my view this is 
not crucial, since most of the adpositions which I discuss are not contro-
versial with respect to which word class they belong to. In Libert (2013) I 
provide a detailed examination of some words whose status as adpositions 
is less clear, and I show how difficult the classification of many putative 
adpoisitions is. For English, Latin, and some other languages, one might 
define adpositions as words which take no inflection (differentiating them 
from nouns, pronouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs) but which assign case 
to their complements (differentiating them from conjunctions and inter-
jections). However, this will not work as a universal definition, as there are 
languages which arguably have inflected adpositions. I will make the some-
what controversial assumption that some sequences of words (e.g. instead 
of) are also adpositions; I am certainly not the only one assuming this, but 
to accommodate such items, my definition of adposition would have to 
be modified. For one discussion (among many) of defining adposition see 
Lunggren (1951).
7 For another type of metalinguistic presupposition in this sense of meta-
linguistic (‘about language’) see Maier (2014). However, such presup-
positions (“quotational presuppositions”, p. 30) seem more like typical 
presuppositions than the kind brought up by Svenonius. Metalinguistic 
preupposition is also used in another way by e.g. García-Ramírez (2010:151, 
153), meaning something like ‘relating to the extralinguistic world’. His 
(ibid.:153) example is given in (i):
(i)  L: Nessie is carnivorous.
      E: No, she isn’t. She doesn’t even exist.
He says (ibid.) about this example, “In [(i)] L uses ‘Nessie’ referentially. So L’s 
use carries a metalinguistic presupposition: that ‘Nessie’ has a referent”. I do 
not mean metalinguistic in this sense.
8 Cf. Corblin (2003), who says (p. 3), “Having argued that this typical exam-
ple of selectional restriction can be described in the same terms than [sic] 
presuppositions, we are lead to conclude that presupposition might be 
nothing else than selection”.
lexical entry for ‘under’ would be <λy.λφ.λx.x φs 
under y, y has spatial location>); Since in standard 
contexts speakers take it for granted that … [the] 
theory of relativity has no spatial location … and 
[(2)] suffer[s] from presupposition failure and [is] 
thus infelicitous.
More generally, “Atomic category mistakes are 
accounted for by the claim that a wide range of expres-
sions (including most verbs, adjectives, adverbs, and 
prepositions) are presupposition triggers” (ibid.) (Note 
that she does not refer to Svenonius in this book, indicat-
ing that she was unaware that he had put forth a simi-
lar idea.) However, Magidor says (p. 1) that “The king of 
the United States is drinking water” is a different kind 
of error than the category errors that she cites there 
(e.g.”John is drinking the theory of relativity”), and this 
seems odd, because according to her, both involve pre-
supposition failure—are there then different kinds of pre-
supposition or different kinds of presupposition failure? 
It would appear so, as she says (p. 146), “Having argued 
that category mistakes are infelicitous because they suffer 
from presupposition failure, a natural question one might 
raise at this point is what separates category mistakes 
from other instances of presupposition failure?” If one 
really believed that category errors were presupposition 
failures, the answer to this question would be “nothing”; 
one would not posit any significant differences between 
e.g. presuppositions triggered by a definite description 
and those triggered by a factive verb (other than obvious 
superficial differences).
However, in Magidor’s favor is the fact that the “presup-
positions” which she mentions seem to pass the projec-
tion tests (pp. 134–138). The first projection test is simply 
the constancy under negation test, but, in my view, con-
stancy under negation is not a sufficient test for presup-
position.9 For one thing, c-selection and conventional 
implicatures survive negation, e.g. in both Mary is poor 
but honest and It is not true that Mary is poor but honest 
the presence of but leads one to conclude that the speaker 
thinks that there is a contrast between being poor and 
being honest. Similar remarks apply to conditionals. Her 
supposed presuppositions also pass the projection tests 
involving conjunctions and questions, but once again, so 
will various other types of things, such as conventional 
implicatures.
Even if Magidor is correct, the presuppositions of 
adpositions which she posits are not of a type particular 
9 I am not the only one who holds this view; I have already mentioned (note 
5) the fact that van der Sandt (1988:37–39) brings up problems with this 
test, although the problems which he raises are different from those which 
I have in mind.
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to this word class, and so are not of particular interest if 
we are focussing on presuppositions of adpositions.10
On the other hand, Tyler and Evans (2003) bring up sup-
posed presuppositions which may be restricted to adposi-
tions and perhaps words of other classes with meanings 
similar to those of adpositions. In their paper on the poly-
semy of over, they state (p. 49), “a preposition presupposes 
a TR and LM, which are typically supplied linguistically, 
e.g. The picture [TR] is over the mantel [LM]”. Trajector 
(TR) and landmark (LM) name concepts of Cognitive 
Linguistics, the framework which Tyler and Evans are 
using; they (p. 110) describe these concepts as follows:
We call this abstracted mental representation of the 
primary sense [of a locative preposition] the proto-
scene. It consists of a schematic trajector (TR), which 
is the locand (the element located, and in focus), 
and it is typically smaller and movable; a schematic 
landmark (LM), which is the locator (the element 
with respect to which the TR is located, and in back-
ground), and is typically larger and immovable, and 
a conceptual configurational-functional relation 
which mediates the TR and the LM.
Although the “presupposing” which Tyler and Evans 
speak of does pass the negation test (The picture is not 
over the mantel also leads one to think that there is a pic-
ture and a mantel (or, more generally, that there is a 
“locand” and a “locator”)), they do not seem to be using 
presuppose in the technical sense.11 Andrea Tyler (p.c.) 
has verified this.12
However, their sentence does bring up a pitfall one might 
encounter when looking for presuppositions of adpositions: 
10 Macagno (2015) apparently has the same view of presupposition (i.e. that 
it includes s-selection), as he (p. 468) gives “*I am walking in the park with 
Australia” as an example of a presupposition which “can … be triggered by 
syntactic elements … such as prepositions”.
11 This should not be seen as a criticism of them or of anyone else who uses 
presupposition in a non-technical sense; one might say that it is unfortunate 
that a term with an everyday meaning was chosen for this sort of implica-
tion. This situation does not arise with terms such as conventional implica-
ture, which have only a technical sense.
12 She stated:
What we were attempting to convey was the idea that most preposi-
tions started out as spatial markers which articulated a spatial rela-
tionship between an entity in focus (TR) and a locating/background 
entity (LM). Conceptually, this relationship between a TR and LM 
continues. In many uses, prepositions have, of course, changed and 
extended so that they act as adverbs, etc, so the syntax has changed. 
However, conceptually, this relationship between a TR and LM 
continues. On the surface, it may look like the TR-LM relation has 
disappeared. But even in a sentence like: ‘Class is over’, conceptu-
ally there is a TR (the class—a metonymy for the activity of a group 
of students and a teacher carrying outparticular activities) and the 
unarticulated LM (analogous to the hur[d]le the horse jumps over)—
the period of time the class meets. In order for class to be completed 
(over), the people involved in the teaching/learning activity must 
temporally get beyond the allotted time for the activity.
The picture is over the mantel certainly does presuppose the 
existence of a picture and a mantel, but this is because of 
the definite NPs The picture and the mantel, definite NPs 
being among the most familiar presupposition triggers, 
and not because of the preposition over. Given that most 
adpositional objects are NPs, and that even some indefinite 
NPs have been argued to be presupposition triggers (e.g. by 
von Fintel 1998), athough not specifically those in the com-
plement position of PPs, a large proportion of sentences 
containing adpositions will have presuppositions about 
the existence of entities or objects named by their objects, 
but these presuppositions will not be of interest to us as 
they are not triggered by the adpositions themselves. Most 
probably, we will have to disregard many or all existential 
presuppositions in such contexts (though adpositions may 
be triggers of other types of presupposition); adpositions do 
not seem to be able to trigger existential presuppositions, 
which should not be a surprise—some verbs can trigger 
presuppositions, but not those of the existential type.
In their (2001) book on the Tungusic language Udihe, 
Nikolaeva and Tolskaya say the following when discuss-
ing postpositions of this language which mean ‘with’ in 
the comitative sense:
The postposition mule ‘with, as distinct from geje 
and zuŋe, presupposes a close “inalienable” associa-
tion between two participants, which must consti-
tute a “natural” pair: a husband and wife, a mother 
and son, cf.: ogbö eni mule ‘elk with female’. So (772a) 
below can only be understood as meaning that I 
climbed the tree with my own (and not somebody 
else’s) younger brother.
Their example (772a) is below:
(3)  Bi neŋu mule mo:-tigi tukti-e-mi
  me younger.sibling with tree-lat13 climb-past- 
1sg
  ‘I climbed the tree with my younger brother.’ 
(ibid.:413)
Once again the “presupposition” probably passes the 
negation test, i.e. I assume that the negative version of (3) 
also gives the impression that neŋu refers to the younger 
sibling of the speaker. However, also once again, I am 
dubious about whether this is presupposition in the rele-
vant sense; if neŋu does not refer to the younger sibling of 
the speaker, (3) will be semantically ill-formed but not in 
the same way as “The present King of France is bald” is—I 
think that it would still have a truth value, unlike the King 
of France sentence (on a semantic rather than pragmatic 
treatment of presupposition). Irina Nikolaeva (p.c.) and 
13 lat stands for ‘lative’.
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Maria Tolskaya (p.c.) have confirmed that in this paper 
presupposes was not meant in a technical sense; the for-
mer author said, “It was meant in a general sense: 
“requires a close inalienable association”.14
Kemmer and Bat-Zeev Shyldkrot (1996:366) discuss the 
difference between French toucher and toucher à, both 
meaning ‘to touch’, as in the following examples (ibid.):
(4a)  Cet enfant touche à tout ce qu’il voit.
  ‘That child touches everything that he sees.’
(4b)  Elle a touché le radiateur.
  ‘She touched the radiator.’
They say:
there is a subtle distinction in usage between these 
forms: a greater degree of intentionality is associated 
with toucher à, as in the case of [(4a)], in which the 
child is touching objects on purpose, presumably to 
explore them. Toucher without the preposition pre-
supposes nothing about intentionality, and is the 
normal form to use in  situations where the subject 
participant has accidently touched something.
If toucher alone does not have a presupposition “about 
intentionality”, we can infer from the above passage that 
toucher à, and specifically à in this context, does have 
such a presupposition. However, it is not clear to me 
that it is a presupposition, even though it seems to sur-
vive under negation: in one reading Cet enfant ne touche 
pas à tout ce qu’il voit the child touches some things, but 
not everything that he sees, and this touching was done 
intentionally. One might argue that this is not a presup-
position, but rather it is an entailment. Consider an Eng-
lish sentence with the same meaning:
(5)  That child is intentionally touching everything 
that he sees.
This sentence of course gives the impression, and in 
fact entails, that the touching was intentional. If we 
negate it, forming That child is not intentionally touching 
everything that he sees, and if we put stress on everything, 
there is still the impression that the touching is inten-
tional, but I would say that this is because the word inten-
tionally entails (and in fact explicitly expresses) 
intentionality. This means that here, and more generally, 
14 Even if mule does not trigger a presupposition (in the technical sense), 
the type of conclusion which it causes (that there is “a close ‘inalienable’ 
association) is of interest; is it simply part of the (truth-conditional) mean-
ing of the word (I suspect not), or is it some sort of pragmatic conclusion 
(i.e. using it when there is not a close relationship is inappropriate, but does 
not cause a proposition to be false)? However, it is beyond the scope of the 
present paper to investigate this.
as I have already remarked, constancy under negation 
may not always be a good test for presupposition.15
We have seen that many uses of “presuppose(s)” and 
“presupposition(s)” in connection with adpositions do 
not seem to involve presupposition in the technical 
sense, and that some uses of these terms in a technical 
sense may not be correct or may involve “presupposi-
tions” which seem rather different from presuppositions 
as they are generally conceived of. Further, some of the 
presuppositions which have been attributed to adpo-
sitions are not limited to adpositions (those involving 
s-selection), and thus are not of interest to a study spe-
cifically on adpositional presuppositions. We now turn to 
some adpositions which may trigger presuppositions.
Factive prepositions
Factive verbs are often listed among presupposition trig-
gers. If there are factive words belonging to other parts of 
speech, presumably they will also trigger presuppositions 
of the same type. Although verbs are the words most com-
monly associated with factivity, there are also (according 
to some authors) factive nouns (see e.g. Vendler 1980:280), 
adjectives (see e.g. Norrick 1978), adverbs (see e.g. Geuder 
2000:111), conjunctions (see e.g. Hengeveld 1998:354–
355), and pronouns (see Cornish 2015).16 The only main 
part of speech of which I have not seen any members 
asserted to be factive (in the relevant sense) is the interjec-
tions.17 I also have not found any references to factive 
15 For discussion of various treatments of presuppositions said to be asso-
ciated with à and another (sometimes) empty French preposition, de, see 
Fraczak (2008). She mentions some situations in which (she claims that) 
the difference or choice between these prepositions (e.g. commencer à vs. 
commencer de, both meaning ‘to begin to’, pp. 178–179) does not depend 
on the presence or absence of presuppositions connected with them. She 
states (p. 179), “We can conclude from this part of the analysis that the use 
of the preposition de, as opposed to à, cannot be systematically associated 
with the factor of situational presupposition”. Earlier (p. 174) she says, “The 
analysis of our corpus of relevant examples leads us to conclude that “lexi-
cal” presupposition is present in a large majority of verbs, independently of 
the preposition used”.
16 Cornish (2015:103) speaks of “a factive pronoun”, e.g. it in “Of course 
anyone who is assaulted can report it to the police” (ibid.); it is also “a bound 
propositional variable (ibid.) in this sentence. He cites (a 1971 reprint of ) 
Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970) in which “factive it” (p. 165) is discussed.’ 
However, this “factive it” is not a presupposition trigger (unlike e.g. the verb 
know), but rather “serves as an optional reduction of the fact” (ibid.), and, 
one might argue, should be called something different (e.g. “factual it”), 
with factive being reserved for the meaning ‘triggers a presupposition of the 
truth of the proposition which it introduces’. It might be difficult to imagine 
a factive pronoun in this sense, since pronouns do not (generally) have com-
plements or introduce propositions.
Capone (2013) does not use the term factive pronoun(s), but he does use 
the term presuppositional clitics (by which he means clitic pronouns (in 
Italian)); on p. 477 he says, “I called these clitics presuppositional clitics 
because, at least when there is no context forcing modal subordination, the 
pronominal clitic serves to promote a proposition to the status of presup-
posed information (a presupposition)”. One might argue that these items 
could have been called factive pronouns.
17 On the other hand, not everyone accepts the existence of factive verbs; 
see e.g. Hazlett (2010), who seems to reject the factivity of words in general.
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numerals. It would therefore not be a surprise to see refer-
ences to factive adpositions, but there seem to be very few 
such references (in the relevant sense of factive).
Van Dijk (2011:45) does cite despite as a factive prepo-
sition.18 However, he does not discuss it in detail. It is dif-
ficult to test it for presuppositionality, since its objects will 
often or usually trigger presuppositions by themselves. 
Consider for example the following sentences:
(6a)  Despite their opposition we continued with 
the project.
(6b)  Their opposition caused much unhappiness.
Among the presuppositions of (6a) is something like 
‘they were opposed to a project’, but this is also a presup-
position of (6b), which lacks prepositions. We therefore 
need sentences without adpositional objects, e.g. definite 
NPs, which are presupposition triggers.
It may not be sufficient to place indefinite NPs in the 
complement position of adpositions, since, as mentioned 
above (according to some authors) they, or at least some of 
them, can also trigger presuppositions, as in the following 
examples:
(7a) 
 Despite an increase in opposition we continued with the 
project.
(7b) 
 An increase in opposition caused us to drop the project.
Both of these examples presuppose that there was an 
increase in opposition (among some people) for the pro-
ject in question; since despite does not occur in (7b) it can-
not be responsible for the presupposition (that there was 
an increase in opposition) which these examples share.19
One might think that gerund constructions can be 
adpositional complements which may not by themselves 
trigger presuppositions (or at least not the same kind of 
presuppositions), as in the examples below:
18 On p. 44 he calls despite in the following example (p. 43) a factive adverb:
[regrets] that despite sustained diplomatic effort by Her Majesty’s Gov-
ernment it has not proved possible to secure a second Resolution in the 
UN because one Permanent Member of the Security Council made 
plain in public its intention to use its veto whatever the circumstances.
However, this seems incorrect, as it is clearly a preposition here (and in general).
19 Even when there is no article, a presupposition of this sort can be cre-
ated:
(ia)  Increases in opposition caused us to drop the project.
(ib)  Opposition to the project caused us to drop it.
(ia) presupposes that there were increases in opposition, and (ib) presup-
poses that there was opposition to the project.
(8a)  Despite opposing us for weeks, in the end he 
helped us with the project.
(8b)  Despite his opposing us for weeks, in the end 
he helped us with the project.
(8c)  Despite him opposing us for weeks, in the end 
he helped us with the project.
Here we have what one could see as a factive presuppo-
sition (‘he opposed us for months’). However, one might 
argue that this is not due to the presence of despite, since 
in the absence of this word there the same presupposition 
exists.
(9)  Opposing us for weeks, he finally gave in and 
helped us with the project
I may not find this sentence to be perfectly well-formed, 
but similar sentences are clearly well-formed, e.g. Having 
missed my bus to the airport, I had to take a taxi. Such 
sentences, specifically the gerund construction part, carry 
the same sort of factive presupposition, e.g. (9) presup-
poses that he (whoever he was) opposed us for weeks. The 
literature contains other examples of gerund construc-
tions which are said to have presuppositions, e.g.:
(10a) 
 Fred allowed Mary’s sleeping in on Saturdays. (Asher 
1993:191)
(10b) 
 John’s hitting Mary was a bad thing to do. (ibid.)
(10c) 
 Him hitting her so hard frightened Mary. (ibid.:194)
(10d) 
 John sprinting past Bill was a welcome sight. (ibid.:196)
The first two examples have “POSS-ing constructions” 
(Asher 1993:190). Asher (1993:191) says, “[(10a)] has a fac-
tive presupposition or at least implicature … The presup-
position is that Mary did sleep in on Saturdays. [(10c)] 
carries a similar presupposition”. One might not be sur-
prised that they cause presuppositions, since possessed 
NPs in general trigger presuppositions, e.g. John’s guitar 
triggers the presupposition ‘John has a guitar’. This could be 
attributed to the fact that they are definite NPs. While (10a-
b) do not involve possession in a literal sense, the gerund 
constructions in them are still definite, e.g. there might be 
various acts of hitting, or of hitting Mary, but John’s hitting 
Mary refers to one particular act. Mary’s sleeping in on Sat-
urdays does not refer to one particular event, but it does 
refer to a particular series or set of events.20
20 However, Asher (1993:192) states that “such presuppositions can be can-
celled in certain contexts” and gives the example Mary prevented John’s 
kicking the cat.
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(10c) and (10d) involve an “ACC-ing construction” 
(ibid.:196), about which Asher (ibid.) says the following:
ACC-ing constructions introduce a possibility dis-
course reference and a factive presupposition. Some 
predicates of ACC-ing constructions may block this 
factive construction, in which case the the ACC-
ing construction will denote a possibility. If nothing 
blocks the factive presupposition, the ACC-ing con-
struction will denote a fact.
More generally, Ormazabal (2005:105) gives “gerundi-
val constructions” as an example of “complement[s] that 
cannot be non-factive”, as shown by the following (ibid.) 
examples:
(11a)  *John thought/believed [the fact that the earth 
is round]
(11b)  *John thought/believed [Mary going to the 
movies]
Presumably (11a) is ill-formed because a factive com-
plement (the fact that …) is the complement of a non-fac-
tive verb; if (11b) is ill-formed for the same reason, then 
Mary going to the movies, and other gerund construc-
tions, are necessarily factive. There are clearly some sen-
tences containing gerund constructions which do not 
have factive presuppositions, e.g. Going to the movies 
would be nice. Asher might argue that in such cases the 
factivity of Going to the movies is cancelled, as with the 
example in note 20; in the present case the modality of 
the main clause would cause the cancellation.21
Portner (1995:620) gives the following examples of sen-
tences containing gerunds:
(12a)  It’s unlikely that calling the fire station brought 
help.
(12b)  Lifting those clocks didn’t tire me out.
(12c)  Sam didn’t believe that planting cacti tired me 
out.
(12d)  If planting cacti tired Sam out, he will surely 
die.
He states (ibid.), “the events picked out by the gerunds 
[in these examples] are presupposed to have occurred”. 
Notice that these examples are neither POSS-ing con-
structions nor ACC-ing constructions, as they do not 
have an overt subject. Thus all of the major types of ger-
und construction have been said to trigger presupposi-
tions. However, Portner does not think that all types of 
21 One might then ask why thought or believed in (11b) cannot cancel the 
factive presupposition of the gerundive construction; I do not know how 
people holding views like those of Asher and Ormazabal would answer this.
gerund construction are presuppositional; on p. 637 he 
gives the following examples:
(13a)  John imagined Bill’s leaving.
(13b)  John imagined/predicted the earthquake.
(14a)  John imagined Bill leaving.
(14b)  John imagined/predicted an earthquake.
For Portner some gerunds may well be definite and 
others indefinite, and this property (not surprisingly) is 
connected with presuppositionality; he says the following 
(ibid.) about the above examples:
[(13b)] presupposes that a particular earthquake is 
somehow salient in the conversation, just as [(13a)] 
presupposes that a leaving is under discussion Nei-
ther [(14a)] nor [(14b)] presuppose any event. The 
difference between [(13b)] and [(14b)] is simply defi-
niteness, and it’s seems [sic] likely that it’s the same 
difference in [(13a)]–[(14a)].
We can imagine that Asher, or someone with similar 
views, might say that in fact the gerund construction in 
(14b) is presuppositional, but this presuppositionality is 
cancelled by the verb imagined. However, there is a com-
plication here: in the passage quoted above the presup-
position is actually not a factive one, i.e. Portner is not 
saying that (13b) involves a factive presupposition (which 
would be that Bill left), but only a presupposition that an 
event of leaving is “under discussion” (and it would be 
hard to imagine it not being under discussion, since it is 
mentioned in the sentence). Most authors would say that 
(13a) involves an existential presupposition (that there 
was an earthquake), not (only) a presupposition (if it is 
such) that “a particular earthquake is somehow salient in 
the conversation”. It would appear that Portner has made 
some kind of error; we might rather say that (13b) pre-
supposes the existence of a particular earthquake [unlike 
(14a)], and that (13a) has a factive presupposition (that 
Bill left) [unlike (14a)].22
There are thus various views about the factive status of 
(some types of ) gerund constructions, which makes it 
difficult to determine the factivity of adpositions which 
take such constructions as complements. If all types of 
gerund construction are presuppositional, it would be 
very difficult or impossible to test whether despite is a 
presupposition trigger, as all the complements which it 
could have (e.g. NPs headed by verbal nouns or by 
22 This is not to say that I agree with this view; I am simply stating what 
Portner might have said if we remove the idea that “salience” or being 
“under discussion” are presuppositions.
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gerunds) are presupposition triggers themselves.23 The 
same applies to other prepositions which can take ger-
und constructions as complements; (15a) and (15b) cre-
ate the presupposition ‘he opposed us’ but the gerund 
constructions alone (without because of/due to) have 
this presupposition.24 
(15a)  Because of him opposing us, we dropped the 
project.
(15b)  Due to him opposing us, we dropped the 
project.
If, on the other hand, at least some gerund construc-
tions are not factive (and in my view the best candidates 
for non-factivity might be gerund constructions without 
anything overt corresponding to subjects in finite clauses, 
e.g. Going to the movies in Going to the movies would be 
nice), then despite and other prepositions which can take 
gerund complements could be shown to be factive, as in 
Despite going to the movies this afternoon, I was still in a 
gloomy mood.
If we now look at some other claims about adpositional 
presuppositionality, Bonyadi and Samuel (2011:9) are 
incorrect when they state that given (as a preposition) 
causes presuppositions in examples such as the following 
(ibid.)25:
(16)  Given Russia’s oil wealth and nuclear arse-
nal, the West’s leverage is limited, but not 
inconsequential.
That is, the definite NP Russia’s oil wealth and nuclear 
arsenal alone triggers the presupposition that ‘Russia has 
oil wealth and a nuclear arsenal’; we cannot test whether 
23 An indicatation that such cases involve presupposition (rather than 
entailment) comes from the negation facts, e.g. both (10d) and (i) presup-
pose that John sprinted past Bill:
(i)  John sprinting past Bill was not a welcome sight.
24 Admittedly, the removal of the presuppositions from these examples 
makes them less than perfectly well-formed (??him opposing us, we dropped 
the project), but since similar examples are (or have been claimed to be) 
well-formed, e.g. (10c), it is not unreasonable to think that the ACC-ing 
constructions in (15a–b) are presupposition triggers (but that they require a 
preposition for some unrelated reason).
25 They are correct about given that being a presupposition trigger, as in (i), 
but if we consider given that to be a conjunction, then it is not relevant for 
us:
(i)  Given that North Korea has made this decision to serve its own national 
interests, the same approach cannot be used for other countries. (ibid.:10).
given adds any presupposition(s) to the sentence.26 The 
presupposition here is existential, but given could take a 
gerund complement, e.g. Given John’s constant bragging, 
we expected more from him, and such cases would involve 
factive presuppositions. In these cases, as well as in (16), 
the factivity may be due to the complement and not 
(only) to given, and thus given may not be factive.
Bonyadi and Samuel may be also be incorrect about 
instead of, as in the example (ibid.:9) below, being a pre-
supposition trigger:
(17)  Instead of defending Zimbabwe’s people and 
their right to democratic change, he [South 
African’s president] has shamefully chosen to 
protect Mr. Mugabe.
That is, if defending Zimababwe’s people … is factive, 
then we need not attribute factivity to instead of, or we 
could say that it is factive, but this factivity is vacuous 
since its complement is factive.27
However, this example is interesting, because my sense 
of factivity here seems weaker, that is, the presupposition 
(‘South African’s president did not defend Zimbabwe’s 
people and their right to democratic change’ (ibid.)) 
does not seem as strong as presuppositions triggered by 
despite. This may be because I can imagine a type of situ-
ation where instead of does not trigger a presupposition: 
if we are discussing a trip to be taken by you and I say:
(18)  Instead of going to Philadelphia, you should 
go to/you should consider going to New York.
Here there is no presupposition that you have gone to or 
will go to Philadelphia; perhaps this is due to the modal-
ity of the main clause, marked by should; that is, the main 
clause, and the whole sentence, is marked as being hypo-
thetical, and thus some presuppositions involved with it 
may be weakened or may disappear. In (18) there is per-
haps a presupposition that the addressee is considering 
going to Philadelphia (or that this idea is “under discus-
sion”, as Portner would say). However, it could be argued 
that this is a conversational implicature; it would not be 
relevant (and thus not felicitous) to utter (18) in a context 
where the addressee has no plans to go to Philadelphia.
26 A example from outside the realm of linguistics could help clarify the 
situation. Let us imagine that some medical condition has been claimed to 
be fatal, but only to people over the age of 150. We cannot test whether it is 
in fact fatal, because any possible subjects for such a test would already have 
died before they reached their 150th birthday (from some other fatal condi-
tion or disease). The condition in question may well be fatal to them, but 
this cannot be proved (or disproved, for that matter).
27 It is curious that there is diagreement about the factivity of some gerund 
constructions; one might not expect this, since it is fairly clear which verbs 
are factive (e.g. know) and which are not (e.g. think).
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In contrast, it appears that any presuppositions (or 
implicatures) triggered by despite are not affected by 
modality, as shown below:
(19)  Despite being tired, you would be better off if 
you finished your paper today.
That is, even though this is a hypothetical situation, 
there is an implication that the addressee is or will be 
tired.
Directional adpositions
Let us now turn to another type of adposition. O’Keefe 
(1996:305) discusses the following sentence:
(20)  The icicle fell from the roof to the garden.
On the next page is a drawing meant to show part of 
the meaning of this sentence, and on p. 305 he says, “The 
left side of the representation shows the unstated presup-
position that the icicle was on the roof for some unstated 
time prior to the event of the sentence”. I do not think that 
he is using presupposition in its technical sense, because 
in this sense presuppositions are always unstated. How-
ever, there is an insight here, and one might argue that in 
fact this is a presupposition in the technical sense, and, 
more generally, that sentences containing from X pre-
suppose that the object or entity in motion was at/in/on 
X before the motion. This seems to be a presupposition 
rather than (only) an entailment; as indicated by the fact 
that it passes the negation test (The icicle did not fall from 
the roof also leads one to conclude that the icicle was on 
the roof ), is maintained in questions (Did the icicle fall 
from the roof?), and can be cancelled:
(21)  The icicle did not fall from the roof, because in 
fact it never was on the roof.
To my knowledge, this insight has not been stated else-
where in the literature on presupposition and from has 
not been listed among presupposition triggers.28 It is par-
allel to begin to (whose presuppositions have been dis-
cussed in some of the literature) in the sense that an 
initial, pre-event status is presupposed—a location in the 
28 On the other hand, it is not clear to me that O’Keefe is correct when con-
cerning (20) he speaks of (p. 305) “the presupposition that the icicle contin-
ues in the garden for some duration after the event”. It is an entailment, not 
a presupposition, of to X that the entity or object in motion reaches (and at 
least briefly stays) at X. Evidence of this is that it does not survive negation 
(John did not go to Sydney does not lead to the conclusion that he reached 
or was at Sydney) and cannot be cancelled (#John went to Sydney but he did 
not reach it (only good if to means ‘toward’) or #John went to Sydney but he 
was never there).
case of fell from and a state of not doing something in the 
case of begin to. Note the asymmetry between from and 
to in this context, which might appear odd since they are 
both prepositions, but this asymmetry is parallel to that 
relating to begin to—begin to presupposes an initial state 
of not doing something, but entails the subsequent state 
of doing that thing, e.g. John began to run presupposes 
that he was not already running (cf. John did not begin to 
run because he was already running), but entails that he 
was subsequently running; note the semantic ill-formed-
ness of #John began to run but did not actually run.29 We 
find a similar situation with to stop x-ing (a construction 
which is much discussed in the literature on presupposi-
tions); John stopped smoking presupposes that he smoked, 
but entails that he ends up not smoking, and here the 
intuitions may be clearer: #John stopped smoking, but he 
continued to smoke.
Similar facts obtain with leave, which need not be fol-
lowed by from (but can be); John left (from) Sydney pre-
supposes that he was in Sydney, and one might therefore 
argue that from itself is not a preposition trigger (i.e. that 
leave is the trigger of the preposition). However, from is 
required with most other verbs of motion (e.g. *The icicle 
fell roof to the garden), and so is the only candidate for the 
trigger of the presupposition with such verbs.
I have said that the preposition to entails rather than 
presupposes being at the destination in sentences such as 
(20). However to does trigger a presupposition, and again 
there is a parallel with begin to: (20) presupposes that the 
icicle was not (already) on the roof, just as begin to x pre-
supposes that the subject was not already doing x.30 This 
presupposition passes the negation test: John did not go 
to Sydney presupposes that John was not in Sydney, but 
one can cancel this presupposition (as one would expect):
(22)  No, John did not go to Sydney yesterday, 
because he was already there.
The situation is the same with the prepositions into and 
onto, as well as some other prepositions when used in a 
directional (rather than a locational) sense, e.g. under; 
John went under the house presupposes that he was not 
already under the house.
29 This sentence is actually acceptable with begin to meaning ‘prepare to’ or 
something similar, but this may be a repair reading.
30 Note that the presupposition of begin to is not dependant on the infini-
tival to; begin x-ing triggers the same kind of presupposition. In both cases 
the presupposition disappears when begin (to) means’ begin to do some-
thing (again)’ in a certain period of time, on a sort of iterative reading, e.g. I 
worked on the paper until 11 p.m., woke up at 7 a.m. and began to work on 
it (again). One could say that the presupposition is that the subject was not 
doing x immediately before the beginning of the action, just as John went to 
Sydney does not presuppose that John had never been to Sydney before, but 
only that he was not there immediately prior to the act of going.
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Such facts seem obvious, but they have rarely if ever 
been noted before. It thus seems that there are some 
clear instances of adpositions acting as presupposition 
triggers.
Conclusion
We have seen that many of the non-temporal adposi-
tions which have been asserted to be presupposition 
triggers turn out not to be so, or the type of presuppo-
sition (those involving “category mistakes” or s-selec-
tion) which they trigger are not unique to adpositions. 
However, there may be several factive prepositions (e.g. 
despite), and directional adpositions in general (including 
from, when marking the starting point of motion) trig-
ger presuppositions. The class of adpositions is thus like 
the class of verbs; both have some members which are 
presuppositional and some (perhaps the majority) which 
are not. One reason for this may be that both verbs and 
adpositions can be involved in the description of motion/
direction.
If we think about word classes in general, there are 
three possibilities for presuppositionality: (1) no mem-
bers can be presuppposition triggers, (2) some, but not 
all, members can be presupposition triggers, and (3) all 
members can be presupposition triggers. As we have 
seen, the second possibility holds of both verbs and 
adpositions. As far as I know, there no word classes all 
of whose members are presuppositional, and in fact it 
might be difficult to imagine such a language with such 
a word class, especially the class of verbs; presumably 
every language must be able to express ‘to know’ and 
‘to think’ (or something similar), and there is some-
thing in the nature of the states themselves (knowing 
and thinking) which makes them factive, and hence pre-
suppositional (in the case of ‘to know’) and non-factive 
(‘in the case of think’)—a factive version of ‘to know’ 
seems to be the same or similar in meaing to ‘to think’ 
or ‘to believe’. It is easier to imagine a language all of 
whose adpositions are presuppositional since there are 
some languages with very small inventories of adposi-
tions, and so there could be a language with only two 
adpositions, both of which are directional, and hence 
presuppositional. However, I do not know of any such 
language.
While word classes which are completely presuppo-
sitional may be rare or non-existent, as I noted above, 
there are (at least) two word classes which have no 
presuppositional members, interjections and numer-
als. While numerals can create conversational impli-
catures (of the scalar type), it is hard to imagine (at 
least for me) how a number could trigger a presuppo-
sition. It is almost as difficult to conceive of a presup-
positional interjection; one possibility might be a factive 
interjection. For example, if I utter the Oh! of surprise, I 
could either be reacting to an event or situation which 
I know to be actually happening, or to a possible, but 
not clearly true, event or situation, and some language 
could have different words meaning ‘Oh!’ for these two 
situations. If someone heard the first Oh!, they would 
conclude that whatever surprised the speaker was 
something the speaker knew to be true. However, this 
seems far-fetched, and I know of no language with such 
interjections.
Thus, while there seems to be some connection 
between word class and presuppositionality, in the sense 
that some word classes rule out the possibility of being 
presuppositional, there is not a strong connection, as 
some or all of the other words classes (e.g. adpositions) 
have both presuppositional and non-presuppositional 
members. Whatever property or properties make a word 
presuppositional seem largely independent of the proper-
ties which are responsible for a word being placed in one 
or another word class.
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